THE

AMERICAN LAW REGISTER
AND

REVIEW.
JULY, 1895.
PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As

MARKED

BY

DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS FOR JUNE.

Edited by ARDEMUS STEWARTI.

'The Supreme Court of Louisiana, in A,-T Orleans City &
L. R. Co. v. State Board of Arbitration, 17 So. Rep. 418,
A rbitration," has recently given a very full statement of the
State Board, powers and duties of the state board .of arbitration,
established for the settlement of labor disputes,
Labor
Disputes
which is empowered to hold an investigation without the consent of all the parties, (t) On application of em-iloyers or employes, or of a duly authorized agent of the latter;
or (2) On notification from the mayor or a district judge in the
parishes that a lock-out or strike is seriously threatened. The
summary of these powers and duties is as follows:
(I) The board is not vested with judicial functions. It sits
as a court of conciliation, with the authority to formulate a
decision, and to have it recorded:
(2) In the first instance, it is the duty of the board to pass
upon questions of regularity and compliance with the statute,
or the contrary, in the steps taken to bring labor troubles to,
its notice :
(3) It is authorized to hear the parties, make inquiry into
the causes of trouble, advise the parties, and keep a record of
its decision regarding the cause of dispute:
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(4) It is not bound in all things to decide according to,
technical rules of law that would possibly determine issues in
a court of justice, but it is subject to the .terms of the statute:
under which it was organized, and is bound to observe those
broad rules of law and equity without which no board of arbitration and conciliation can make a just decision:
(5) Objections upon the grounds of irregularity must be
urged before the board, and heard contradictorily with the
parties concerned, or their duly authorized representatives, prior
to application to the court to correct alleged errors:
(6) An apprehension that the conclusion and decision of the
board will be erroneous is no ground for an injunction; for an
injunction will not issue to control the action of public agents,
acting under legislative authority, unless irreparable injury is
evident.
The Court of Appeals of New York has lately held, affirm-ing 32 N. Y. Suppl. 498, that under the rules of the New
York clearing-house, which provide that arrangeBanks,
ments by a member of the association to clear for
Clearing.
house
an outside bank shall not be discontinued without
ule,
Insolvent
Banks

previous notice, and that the notice shall not take
effect until the completion of clearances on the

day after the receipt of the notice, a contract by which a
member agrees with a bank that is not a member to clear for
it, in consideration of a deposit of a certain sum of money and
bills receivable, is valid, and requires the member to pay
checks on the other bank presented to the clearing-house on
the day after notice of discontinuance is given, though it knew
at the time that the other bank was insolvent; and that such
payments are therefore not within the prohibition of the New
York statute, (Laws 1892, c. 68, § 48,) forbidding payments
by an insolvent corporation made with intent to prefer creditors, and the money and securities held under the aforesaid
contract are applicable to the amount of the checks so paid :.
O'Brien v. Grant, 40 N. E. Rep. 871. ANDREWS, C. J., and.
PECKHAM, J., dissented.
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An insolvent building association has the right to make an
assessment on a borrowing member's stock, for
Building
the purpose of covering losses, and thereby equalAssociations,
insolvency,
izing the members, so that at the closing of the
Assessment

affairs of the association all may go out on an
equal. footing: lVol/ford v. Citizens' Building, Loan & Savhigs Assn., (Supreme Court of Indiana,) 4o N. E. Rep. 694.
According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, the provision of a building contract for the forfeiture of $io a day for each day the building reBuilding,
Contract,'
mains unfinished after the day fixed for its comConstruction,
Alteration of

Plans

pletion, does not apply to delay caused by changes
in the material ordered by the owners, though the

contract should provide that any change in the plans, "either
in quantity or quality of the work," shall be executed by the
contractor, "without holding the contract as violated or void
in any other respect:" Lilly v. Person, 32 Atl. Rep. 2"3.
in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Mississippi, a sleeping-car company is not liable'for an assault made by one of its
stewards on a passenger on. one of the regular
Z
Carrjersi
cars of the train, who has without 'rightentered
Assaulton
Trespasser the defendant's car attached to the train, in order
,by Servant

to induce the steward to sell him liquor, in violationi of the law, and of the orders of the' company: Cassedv
v. PZhnan P/ace-Car Co., 17 So. Rep. 373The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas has recently held, in
azcord with the weight of authority, that a person who boards
Licensee, . a train merely to assist another to a seat must
Person -iveg
notice of his intention to get off again, in
Assisting
Another on
Train-

order to hold the company liable for not having
given him time to do so; especially when the

train had stopped the usual and a reasonable time for passengers to get on and off, and he jumped off of his own volition
after it had started: Dilingham v. Pierce, 31 S. W. Rep. 203.
One who boards a train in order to assist another thereon,
without giving the employes of the company any notice of
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his intention to alight, cannot recover, if, after the train has
started, he attempts to get off without requesting that the train
be stopped, and is injured while so doing: Central R. R. &
Banking Co. of Georgia v. Letcher, 69 Ala. io6. See 2 A,%i.
L. REG. & REV. (N. S.) 15 I.
In Griswold v. Chic. & IV. TV. Ry. Co., 64 Wis. 652; S. C.,
26 N. W. Rep. IOI, a person not a passenger got upon a railroad train at a station in order to assist his wife, who was a
passenger, to alight therefrom. She had already left the
train; and while he was standing on the platform of a car, the
train suddenly started, and he was thrown off and injured.
Before it started, however, all passengers for that station had
got off, those waiting to take the train had got on, and the
mail, express matter and baggage had been put off. None of
the employes of the company knew that he expected to go on
the train, or that he had done so; and a brakeman knew that
his wife had got off the train, and needed no assistance. Upon
these facts, it was held that he could not recover.
When the plaintiff, who was injured by the negligence of a
servant of the company, was at the time of the injury on a trip,
Injury to
Passenger,

Free Pass

by special invitation, in the officers' car, and was

not called upon to pay his fare, the fact that he
held an annual free pass over the road does not

relieve the company from liability. It will not be assumed,
from the fact that he had a free pass, that he was using it orr
the occasion in question, in the face of a special request to ride
in the officers' car, where fare is not charged: Thomzson v.
Yazaoo & Ill V. R. Co., (Supreme Court of Louisiana,) 17 So.
Rep. 503.

In Great Northern Railway Co. v. Palmer, [1895] r Q. B.
862, a very interesting case recentry decided by the Queen's
Bench Division, the defendant, a passenger on the
Passenger,
Conditions of plaintiff's railway, took a special excursion ticket
entitling her to travel from Peterborough to WoodLimited
Ticket
hall Spa, at a fare considerably lower
than the
ordinary fare. The ticket contained a condition that if used
for any other station it would be forfeited and the full fare
The defendant traveled to and returned from
,charged.
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Horncastle, a station beyond Woodhall Spa, paying the ordinary fare for the journeys between Woodhall Spa and l4orncastle. The total amount paid by the defendant was much
less than the ordinary return fare between Peterborough and
Horncastle. Upon these facts the court held that the condition as to forfeiture was applicable to stations beyond that
named on the ticket as well as to intermediate stations; and
that as the defendant had used the ticket for a journey to a
station other than that named on it, and not merely for a
journey to the station for which it was available, the plaintiffs
were therefore entitled to treat the ticket as forfeited, and to
recover the full fare.
The Supreme Court of Illinois has recently held, in Pope v.
Ha.zke, 40 N. E. Rep. 839, that, since notes given in settlement of gambling traisactions are void, even in
Contracts
the hands of innocent indorsdes" fdr value before
Gambling,
Innocent
maturity, by the, express language of Rev., Stat.
Holder,
136. such notes will
I1893, e. 38, §§ 131 &
Conflict
&16
oi Laws

Il'83'.3,§z,11

-not be enforced, although made and indorsed in
another state, by the laws of which such fiotes, though invalid as between the original parties, are good in the hands of
innocent indorsees.
A contract between a purchaser of", futures" "and a broker,
made without the state, during the existende of a statute making it unlawful to deal in futures " ' in this state," cannot be enforced in the state, though valid where' made: Lemonfus v.
Jfaycr, 71 Miss. 514; S.'C.,. 14 So. Rep. 33; White v. Eason,
(Miss.) 15 So. Rep. 66.
The Privy Council of England, in Forgetv. OstigitY,[1895]
A. C. 3 18, has adopted the sound rule, that'when a broker is
stock
-employed to make purchases and sales of
Gambling
Contract, " for a principal whose object is not investment
but speculation, and these purchases and sales
Delivery
are actually completed by delivery to the holder, who ob-"
tains the money necessary to pay the advances required by
hypothecating the stock, the transactions are not gamnbing
contracts; for delivery to the broker is delivery to the principal.'
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There is an annotation on this subject, in I A.M. L. REG. &
Rev. (N. S.) 436.
An association of fire underwriters, formed under an agreement providing for the regulation of premium rates, the prevention of rebates, the compensation of agents,
Restraint of
and nonintercourse with companies not members,
Trade,
Combination is not an illegal conspiracy, and the accomplishof Insurers

ment of its purposes by lawful means will not be
enjoined at the suit of a company not a member of the association: Continental Ins. Co. v. Board of Fire Underwriters of
Ihe Pacific, (Circuit Court, Northern Dist. of California,) 67
Fed. Rep. 310.

According to a recent opinion of Judge WALES, of the Court
of Oyer and Terminer of New Jersey, in the case of State v.
Criminail-aw,
New Trial,
Use of Liquor
by Jury

Harrigan,31 Atl. Rep. lo52, the use of intoxicating liquors by members of the jury, during a trial
for capital felony, unless so excessive as to dis-

qualify them for the intelligent performance of
their duty, is no ground for a new trial ; though it is irregular,
and both the person who furnishes it, and the jurors who drink
it, are deserving of censure, and may be punished for so acting
without the permission of the court.
The old rule was that any indulgence in intoxicating liquors
by the jury, during the progress of either a civil or criminal
trial, was ground for setting aside the verdict, although the
quantity taken was not enough to affect them in the least:
Pea. v. Douglass, 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 26; B rantv. Fowler, 7 Cow.
(N. Y.) 562; Gregg v. McDaniel, 4 Harr. (Del.) 367; but
the New York cases cited were overruled by Wilson v. Abrahams, i Hill, 207, and the general rule now is, that indulgence
in liquor by any of the jury, during a trial, whether criminal or
civil, will not vitiate the verdict, unless it had an apparent
effect upon those who partook of it, or was such as to create
a presumption that they were affected by it : Peo. v. Sansome,
98 Cal. 235 ; S. C., 33 Pac. Rep. 202; Peo. v. Bemmnerly, 98
Cal. 299; S. C., 33 Pac. Rep. 263; Commonwealtt v. Cleary,
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48 Pa. 26; Howe v. State, i i Humph. (Tenn.) 491 ; King
20 S. W. Rep. r69; Sanitary
District of Chicago v. Cullerton, 147 Ill. 385 ; S. C., 35 N. E
Rep. 723; especially if administered by a physician to a sick
juror: Peo. v. Pscherhofer,64 Hun, (N. Y.) 483.
It has been held, however, that when the jury has drunk
intoxicating liquor during the trial, it raises a presumption
against the validity of the verdict, which may be rebutted by
showing that in fact the jurors were not intoxicated: State v.
iadigan, (Minn.) 59 N. W. Rep. 490; and in any case, the
drinking of liquor during a trial is a gross impropriety, for which
the juror, and the officer permitting it, may and should be
punished : SanitaryDistrictof Chicagov. Cullerton, 147 Ill. 385 ;
S,C., 35 N. E. Rep. 7233. Ifliquoris drunk at all,it should only
be under the direction of the court: State v. Reed, (Idaho,) 35
Pac. Rep. 7o6; and the better course is for the trial judge to
forbid the use of liquor in the jury room, unless by permission
of the court, and for cause shown: Commonwealtk v. Cleay,
148 Pa. 26. A violation of such an order will of course vitiate
the verdict.
When the jury are allowed to separate at each day's
adjournment, and a juror has been drunk one evening, but is
not obviously drunk when he appears in his place the next
day, there being other circumstances favoring the defendant, a
new trial should be granted: Brown v. State, (Ind.) 36 N. E.
Rep. i io8; and when the drinking of liquor by a juror is
attended with improper conduct, as when he separates from his
fellows to drink in a bar-room, or when liquor is conveyed to
him by one who is interested in the result of the trial, a new trial
should be granted: Commonwealth v. Salyards, 13 Pa. C. C.
470; and of course if he is obviously intoxicated, the verdict
will be set aside.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey has recently decided,
that an act which provides that if a prisoner shall plead guilty
to an indictment for murder, that plea shall be
Pleading,
4constltutional disregarded, a plea of not guilty be substituted, and
Law
the case be tried by a jury, is constitutional, since

-v. State, 91 Tenn. 617; S. C.,

such a provision is favorable to the accused, and does not
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deprive him of any indefeasible right : Genz v. State, 31 At.
Rep. (037.
The Court of Appeals of New York, in ht re Buchanan, 4o
N. E. Rep. 883, has asserted some very salutary principles of
criminal law, which the counsel for the criminal
Unauthorized
attempted to obscure, but ineffectually. These
Appeal,
Effect Of
were (i) That as no appeal lies to the federal
Reprieve
surm
corfrm
apl
supreme
court
from an order of a federal district.
judge, made at chambers, denying a writ of habeas corpus, thetaking of such an appeal does not act as a supersedeas,so as
to prevent, until the determination of the appeal, the execution
of the death sentence imposed by a state court on the appellant; and (2) That when a reprieve is granted in a capital
case to a day certain, the warden should execute the sentence
on the day the reprieve expires, and the time of execution
need not be again fixed by the court.
When the execution of the sentence of a convict is respited
by the governor, for the purpose of having the conviction
reviewed by an appellate court, it is the duty of the sheriff to
execute the sentence of the court on the day to which theexecution is respited, unless the judgment be reversed or
annulled, or a further respite be granted; and it is not necessary in such a case that the convict be previously brought into
court by habeas cor.pus: Peo. v. Enoch, 13 Wend. 159. And
a warrant from the governor to the sheriff, to suspend the
execution of a prisoner until a day specified, and commanding
him on that day, between the hours named, to execute the
sentence, is a proper form of reprieve, and authorizes the
sheriff, on the day named, to execute the prisoner, without the
further order of the court: Sterling v. Drake, 29 Ohio St. 457.
According to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the erection of a roofed porch, built on brick foundations, and permanently attached to the whole front width of a
Deed,
Building
house, is a violation of a building restriction in a
Restrictions deed that all buildings shall be erected not less
than a certain number of feet back from the fence line:
Ogontz Land & Improvement CO. v. Johnson, 31 At. Rep..
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ioo8. And in the opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, a similar restriction is violated by the erection,
within the prohibited distance, of a piazza, eight feet wide,
encircled by a railing, and having a roof supported by posts,
attached to a house, and extending along its entire front:
Reardon v. ZUlzrphy, 40 N. E. Rep. 854.
The Vice-Chancellor for Ireland has decided, in the recent
case of Porter v. Walsh, [1895] I Ir. R. 284, that
Donatio
Mortis Causa an unindorsed deposit receipt is a good subjectmatter of a donaio mor/is causa.
The Supreme Court of Georgia has lately ruled, that when
one has for less than the statutory period of prescription used
as a private way a strip of land belonging to anEasement,
Prescriptive, other, and then, at the request of the owner, abanTacking
doned this strip, and with the consent of the
owner used another strip belonging to the latter, in its stead,
as a private way, also for less than the statutory period, the
two users cannot be tacked together so as to create a prescriptive right of way in either strip, though together the period
of use amounts to more than the statutory period: Peters v.
Little, 22 S. E. Rep. 44.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Commonweal/t v. Connally, 4o N. E. Rep. 862, has recently laid down
the principles of law governing a prosecution for
Elections,
CriminalLaw, falsely making or signing a certificate of nominaSigning
Nomination
Paper

tion or nomination paper, as follows: (i) That it
is sufficient to charge the offences in the language

of the statute, as they were unknown at common law; (2) That
a provision that any voter who signs a nomination paper
shall do so in person, requires the voter to sign with his own
hand, or to be present at the signing by another for him, and
request it to be done; and (3) That it is no defence to a prosecution for signing a certificate of nomination in another's
name, that the defendant entertained no criminal intent, and
thought that he had a right to do so.

-430
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The Supreme Court of Missouri, (Division No. I,) has re-cently held, that under a statute (Acts Mo. 1893, § 478,)
which provides that "on receipt of his ballot, the
Preparation
of Ballot
elector shall, forthwith, and without leaving the
polling place, retire alone to one of the places, booths, or
compartments provided, to prepare the ballot," the fact that
several voters neglected to retire to the booths to mark their
ballots will not make their votes illegal, when it does not appear
that such neglect was wilful: Haltv. Scloenecke, 31 S.W. Rep. 97.
The Court of Appeals of New York, in ]n re Goodman, 40
N. E. Rep. 769, has affirmed the decision of the court below,
reported in 31 N. Y. Suppl. 1043, that, under the
Voters,
Students
Constitution of New York, Art. 2, § 3, which provides that, for purposes of voting, no person shall be deemed
to have gained or lost a residence by reason of his presence
or absence while a student of any seminary of learning, he
does not, by rooming in a seminary while a student, gain a
right to vote in the election district in which it is situate. It
modifies the general language of that decision, however, by
adding that there may be circumstances under which a student may gain a residence in the district where the seminary
is situate; but that the acquisition of such a residence must be
not only intended, but accomplished, wholly apart from his position as a student. See 2 Am.L. REG. & REV. (N. S.) 220, 28 1.
Equity cannot, on the ground of preventing a multiplicity of
suits, entertain jurisdiction of a bill by the receiver of a national
Equity,
bank against its stockholders to recover dividends
Pleding,
illegally paid them out of its capital stock, as such
Multifarious-

a bill is multifarious, one stockholder having no
interest in the claim against another: Hayden v. Thompson,
(Circuit Court, Dist. of Nebraska,) 67 Fed. Rep. 273.
ness

A conviction for obtaining property under false pretences
cannot be had on the extrajudicial statements and admissions of the defendant alone as to the falsity
False
Pretences,
of the statements, since that falsity is part of the
Confession
corpus delicti, which must be proved otherwise: Peo.
v. Simonson, (Supreme Court of California,) 4o Pac. Rep. 44o.
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In Capehart v. Foster, 63 N. W. Rep. 257, the Supreme
Court of Minnesota has decided some interesting questions on
Fixtures,
Gas Fixtures,
Steam
Radiators

the subject of fixtures, holding that, as between

mortgagor and mortgagee, (I) Gas fixtures, consist-

ing of chandeliers and burners, screwed to the ends
of the gas pipes projecting from the walls and ceilings of the
building, are not a part of the realty; (2) That the foregoing
is to be regarded as an arbitrary exception to the general rule
regarding fixtures, and does not apply to steam radiators,
attached at the floors to steam pipes by being screwed to them,
and such radiators are to be considered as a part of the realty;
(3) That an electric annunciator, attached to the wall and to
all the wires of the electric bell system of a hqtel, is a part of
the realty; and (4) That an office desk, about twenty-five feet
long, resting on a tile floor, between projections in the walls,
to which it was fastened by screws, and forming, with the
space behind it, the hotel office, is a part of the realty.
As between the holder of a real estate mortgage and a
chattel mortgagee, carpets, curtain rods and gas fixtures, and
their attachments, are movables; but as to whether ranges, hot
water boilers, sinks and washtubs are movables, depends on
when and how they were attached to the house: Mfanning v.
Ogden, 24 N. Y. Suppl. 70.
When land was leased for the use of operating an electric
lighting plant, and the lessee built on a solid stone foundation,
laid with mortar, a substantial dynamo house, in which he
placed two dynamos; and also built a boiler house of rough
lumber upon sills laid on stone or blocks, with a shaft house
or shed, constructed for the most part of old lumber from
buildings on the premises, and a shafting twenty-nine feet long,
resting on trestles imbedded in the ground to the depth of two
feet, it was held that the buildings, as well as the machinery,
-were accessory to the trade, and therefore were removable as
trade fixtures by the lessee, on the termination of the lease:
Brown v. Reno Electric Light & Power Co., 55 Fed. Rep. 229.
In National Bank of Catasauqua v. North, 16o Pa. 303;
S. C., 28 Atl. Rep. 694, it was held that radiators and valves
-connected with steam heating apparatus were not fixtures
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attached to the realty, but were exactly analogous to gas
fixtures, and therefore severable from the real estate.
As between mortgagor and mortgagee, a "bar," fastened by
nails and screws to the wall and floor of a building used by the
mortgagor as a saloon, is a part of the realty, and passes by the
mortgagee: Woodham v. First National Bank of Crookston,
48 Minn. 67; S. C., 5o N. W. Rep. io15.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota has lately ruled, in Stevehot v. Eastern Ry. Co. of Minnesota, 63 N. W. Rep. 256, that
Garnishment,

Common
Carrier

property in the hands of a common carrier, in

transit to a place outside of the state, is not sub-

ject to garnishment, although it is yet within the

state at the time of the service of the garnishee summons.
According to a recent decision of the Common Pleas of
New York City and County, at special term, a
Limitation of provision in an insurance policy, that no action
Right to Sue shall be brought on it by the insured, except
against the attorneys in fact representing all of the insurers,
is against public policy, on the ground that it ousts the jurisdiction of the courts: Knorr v. Bates, 33 N. Y. Suppl. 691.
Insurance,

The Supreme Court of the United States, in refusing the.
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in In re Debs, 15 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 900, went further than the circuit cotirt, and
Interstate
Commerce,
based its decision on exceedingly broad principles,
Obstruction
which will make it a landmark in the legal history
of Mails,
Injunction,

Contempt

of this country.

These, as laid down in the opin-

ion of Mr. Justice BREWER, are as follows:

(I) The government of the United States is one having
jurisdiction over every foot of soil within its territory, and acting directly upon each citizen; and, while it is a government
of enumerated powers, it has within the limits of these powers
all the attributes of sovereignty:
(2) To it is committed power over interstate commerce, and
the transmission of the mail; and the powers thus conferred
are not dormant, but have been assumed and put into practical exercise by the legislation of Congress. In the exercise of
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-these powers, it is competent for the nation (through its officers) to remove all obstructions upon highways, natural or
artificial, to the passage of interstate commerce, or the carrying of the mail:
(3) While it may be competent for the government, (through
the executive branch, and in the use of the entire executive
power of the nation,) to forcibly remove all such obstructions,
it is equally within its power to appeal to the civil courts for
an inquiry and determination as to the existence and character of any alleged obstructions, and if such are found to exisit,
or threaten to occur, to invoke the powers of these courts to
'remove or restrain such obstructions:
t4) The jurisdiction of the courts to interfere in such matters by injunction is one recognized from ancient times, and
by indubitable authority; and is not ousted by the fact that
the obstructions are accompanied by or consist of acts in
themselves violations of the criminal law:
(5) The proceeding by injunction is of a civil character,
.and may be enforced by proceedings in contempt, which are
not an execution of the criminal laws of the land; and therefore the penalty for a-violation of an injunction is no substitute for, and no defence to, a prosecution for any criminal
offence committed in the course of such violation:
(6) That as the complaint in this case clearly showed an
,existing obstruction of artificial highways for the passage of
interstate commerce and the transmission of the mail, not only
.temporarily existing, but threatening to continue, the circuit
court had power to issue its process of injunction; that
having issued, and having been served on the defendants, the
circuit court had authority to inquire whether its orders had
.been disobeyed; when it found that they had been, then to
proceed under Rev. Stat. U. S. § 725, and enter the order of
punishment complained of; and, the circuit court having full
jurisdiction in the premises, its finding of the fact of disobedience is not open to review on habeas corpus in the supreme or
.any other court.

The Supreme

,Court

of Missouri, (Division No. 2,) has
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reccntly decided, that under § 7211 of the Revised Statutes of
Peddler,

that state, which declares that any person who

deals in goods by going from place to place to
sell the same is a peddler, one who, as agent of an establishment located in another state, takes one of the harrows which
it has shipped to an agent in the state, and goes through the
country with it, sometimes selling the single harrow outright,.
at other times taking a written order and then delivering the
one with him, and at other times taking a written order and
then going back for one to the agent to whom they had been
shipped, is a peddler; and, because of the nature of his business, a license tax may be lawfully imposed upon him, without
interfering with interstate commerce : State v. Shoddy,. 3 1
S. W. Rep. 36.
License Tax

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Commonwealth v..
Heckler, 32 Atl. Rep. 52, has recently decided, reversing 14
Pa. C. C. 465, that one who, while driving about
Intoxicating
the neighborhood on Sunday to induce all the
Liquors,
Sunday,
Gift

electors to vote at a coming election, carried a

flask of liquor for his personal comfort, out of
which he gave drinks to those on whom he called, without
charge, and solely to cause good feeling, was not guilty of
furnishing liquor on Sunday, within the act of May 13, 1887,
P. L. lO8, § 17, which prohibits the furnishing of intoxicating
liquors on that day, by sale, gift, or otherwise.
An act restraining and regulating the sale of intoxicating
liquors, which prohibits the furnishing of such liquors on
Sunday, by "sale, gift, or otherwise," does not prohibit the
use of liquors by a private citizen on his own table on Sunday,
or make it a misdemeanor to furnish them to his family or his
guests in his own house; the furnishing that is made punishable is a furnishing in evasion of the law : Commonwealth v.
Carey, 151 Pa. 368; S. C., 25 Atl. Rep. 140, 31 W. N. C.
116.
When a prohibitory liquor law excepts from its provisions
persons who give liquor to " their invited guests at their own
household," one whom another has invited to his house for"
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the purpose of giving him a drink is to be regarded as an
" invited guest," within the meaning of the statute: Powers v..
Commonwcaltl, 90 Ky. 167.
But when a statute prohibits the sale or gift of intoxicating
liquors on election day, it is immaterial that the gift of the
liquor has no reference to the election, as the statute makes
no exception: Wolf v. State, (Ark.) 27 S. W. Rep. 77;
Coineonwealtl v. Murphy, 95 Ky. 38; S. C., 23 S. W. Rep..
655. This seems questionable, however; and it is hardly
likely that a man would be convicted of giving a drink to a
friend, in his own house, on election day.
In Sherras v. De Rutzen, [1895] I Q. B. 918, the Queen's.
Bench Division has recently held, that a statute (35 & 36
Vict. c. 94, § 16, sub-s. 2,) which lirovides that if any
licensed person "supplies any liquor or refreshViolation of
Statute,
ment, whether by way of gift or sale, to any
Scienter
constable on duty, unless by authority of some
superior officer of such constable," he shall be liable to a
penalty, does not apply when the licensed person bona fide
believes that the constable is off duty; but that guilty knowledge is an essential element of the offence. In this case theconstable had removed his armlet, which he was required to
wear while on duty, before going into the house; and
WRIGHT, J., in his opinion, very tersely says: " It is plain
that if guilty knowledge is not necessary, no care on the part
of the publican could save him from a conviction, . . . since.
it would be as easy for the constable to deny that he was on
duty, when asked, or to produce a forged permission from his
superior officer, as to remove his armlet before entering the
public-house."
The same judge also defines very clearly the three classes
of cases in which the mens rea is not requisite, as (I) Those
acts which are not criminal in any real sense, but are acts
which in the public interest are prol4gited under a penalty;
(2) Some, and perhaps all, public nuisances; and (3) Cases in
which, although the proceeding may be criminal in form, it is
really only a summary mode of enforcing a civil right. The
learned gentlemen who would hold a liquor-seller liable in all,

436

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

cases for selling to a minor, in spite of any facts which would
have led an ordinary man to believe him of full age, are
respeztfully referred to a careful perusal of this case.
A receiver of an insolvent corporation, who takes possession
of a leasehold estate held by the corporation, does not thereby
become an assignee of the term, nor liable on the
Lease,Z

Corporation,
Receiver

covenants of the lease, but is liable only for a
reasonable rent while in possession: Bell v. Ameri-

can Protective League, (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,) 40 N. E. Rep. 857.
The House of Lords, in White v. MVellin, [1895] A. C. 154 ,
has held, reversing the decision of the Court of Appeal,
[1894] 3 Ch. 276, 2 AMx. L. REG. & REV. (N. S.)
Libel,
Defamation of 21, that since an action will not lie for a false
Goods,

special

Damage

statement in disparagement of a trader's goods
without proof of special damage, the fact that the

defendant sold the plaintiff's " infant Food," affixing to the
wrappers thereon a label stating that the defendant's food was
far more nutritious and healthful than any other, in the absence
o proof that the statement was untrue, or that it had caused
any damage to the plantiff, would not authorize an action, or
be sufficient ground for the issuing of an injunction to restrain
the defendant.
In determining the question of libel, the headlines of a publication are important, and cannot be disregarded,
for they often render a publication libelous on its
face, which without them might not necessarily be so: Landon
v. Watkins, (Supreme Court of Minnesota,) 63 N. W. Rep. 6 15.
According to a recent decision of the Court of Appeal of
England, when the magistrates of a borough, for the purpose
Headlines of
Article

Privileged

Communication

of facilitating the business of the general annual
licensing meeting, ordered the defendant, who was
head constable of the borough, to issue to persons

having business before the meeting copies of a report made
by him to the magistrates, stating the grounds of objection
taken to the renewal of licenses, the publication of the report
by the defendant, in pursuance of the order of the magistrates,
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was made upon a privileged occasion, and therefore, in the
absence of actual malice on his part, an action could not be
maintained against him in respect of grounds of objection so
published, which the plaintiffs alleged to be a libel upon them:
Andrews v. BoL'r, [1895] I Q. B. 888.
When the defendant, in instituting the prosecution complained of, went before a magistrate with his counsel, to make
a. complaint, expecting to make the complaint
.Malicious
Prosecution, in writing, and that the warrant would be issued
in the usual manner, he is not liable for the act
Acts of
Magistrate

of the magistrate in directing the arrest of the
defendant without a warrant: Pozpard v. Dumas, (Supreme
Court of Michigan,) 63 N. W. Rep. 30r.
When a person institutes a criminal prosecution, knowing
that the facts did not authorize such action, there is no probable cause for the prosecution ; and the finding of
Probable
an indictment, or the fact that a justice of the
Cause
peace required the plaintiff to enter into an undertaking to
abide the order of the district court, is not conclusive proof of
probable cause: Flackler v. Novak, (Supreme Court of Iowa,)
63 N. W. Rep. 348.
Under a statute, (Comp. Stat. Mont., Div. 5, § 13910,) which
furnishing things
mechanics' Liens, provides that "all persons
Sub-Contractor n or doing work shall be considered sub-con
tractors," a sub-contractor in the third degree
Third Degree
is entitled to file a mechanics' lien: Duignan v. ontana Club,
(Supreme Court of Montana,) 40 Pac. Rep. 294.
According to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the issue
of certificates by a clearing-house association, in
National Banks,
return for cash or securities deposited in the
Clearing-house
hands of a committee by the members of the
Certificates
association, which certificates are -receivable in payment of
daily balances, is no violation of the laws relating to national
banks: Phillerv. Paterson1, 32 Atl. Rep. 26.
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The Supreme Court of Appeals of WVest Virginia, in Towit
of Davis v. Davis, 21 S. E. Rep. 9o6, has recently held, that
a merry-go-round, run by a steam engine, the
Nuisance,
whistle of which blew every few minutes, accomAbatement,
panied by a band, and attended by a large, noisy
Merry~goround

and boisterous crowd until after ten o'clock at
night, disturbing some of the people who lived near it, was a
nuisance, and after proper investigation, could be abated by
the town council, under a statute, (Code W. Va., c. 47, § 28,)
giving a town council power to abate, or cause to be abated,
anything which in the opinion of a majority of the whole
council shall be a nuisance. See i Amx. L. REG. & REv.
(N. S.) 872.
Under the Constitution of New York, Art. 13, § 5, providing that no public officer shall receive a free pass from any
Officers,

Free Pass

corporation, a railroad policeman, appointed under
the laws of that state, and employed by the de-

fendant corporation to prevent depredations upon its property,
is not prohibited from receiving a pass from the defendant,
when the pass is part of the compensation the plaintiff was to
receive for rendering services to the defendant, and therefore
was not gratuitous: Dempsey v. NVew York Cent. & H. R. R.
Co., (Court of Appeals of New York,) 40 N. E. Rep. 867.
See 2 Am. L. REG. & REv. (N. S.) 230, 372.
According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
California, an officer cannot be removed from office, during
his second term, for a violation of duty committed
Removal

during his first term, in the absence of express

statutory provisions: Tht-iiston v. Clcrk, 40 Pac. Rep. 435.
Under the provisions of the Constitution of Louisiana, however, which provides in Art. 196 that all state officers shall be
liable to impeachment for certain enumerated causes, and in
Art. 201 that district attorneys, clerks of court, sheriffi, &c.,
&c., shall be removed by judgment of the district court of the
domicile of such officer, for any of the causes enumerated in
Art. 196, that the proceeding for removal is akin to that of
.impeachment; and since impeachment will lie against an
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officer f. acts done in a prcceding term, tile acts denounced
by Art. 196, done in a prior term of office, by an officer who
is his own successor, will form the foundation of a suit for removal, under Art. 201: State v. Bourgeois, 45 La. Ann.
1350; S. C. 14 So. Rep. 28.
An officer cannot be removed for misconduct in another
off-ice which he held prior to his induction into the office from
which it is sought to remove him : Speed v. Common Council
qf ci' of Detroit,98 Mich. 360; S.C., 57 N.W. Rep. 406.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has lately held, in
Ifilco:v v. D2erickson, 31 Atl. Rep. Io8o, that a stipulation that
Partnership,
Articles of Associa-

tion,
Liability of

the death of a partner shall not operate as a

dissolution of the association, but that the
decedent's shares shall thereupon vest in his

Estate of Deceased

Partner
executors, or administrators, or devisees of the
stock, who shall succeed as in case of transfer on the books,
(in which case the assignee of stock is made subject to the
rights and obligations of the original owner thereof,) does not
compel an executor of the deceased partner to accept the
stock which belonged to 'his testators, so as to charge the
decedent's general estate with firm debts contracted after his
death.

According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
Missouri, (Division No. 2) a city ordinance requiring every
Pawnbrokers, pawnbroker to keep a book, in which shall be
Rezuation, entered a description of all property left with him
ity Ordinance in pawn, together with the
name and description
of the person by whom it was left, and to submit such book to
the inspection of the mayor or any police officer, on demand,
is a mere police regulation to aid in the detection and prevention of larceny, which a city has a right to pass, under a
charter giving it power to license, regulate, tax, or suppress
pawnbrokers; and such an ordinance is not unconstitutional,
either (i) as being in conflict with the Fifth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States, providing that.no person
shall be compelled to be a witness against himself in any
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criminal case, or (2) as being in conflict with Art. 2, § 18, of
the Constitution of Missouri, providing that the people shall
be secure in their persons, papers, houses and effects, from
unreasonable searches and seizures: Cit' of St. Joseph v..
Levin, 31 S. W. Rep. ioi.
The Queen's Bench Division of England, in The Q,,cen v.
Baker, [1895] i Q. B. 797, has lately held, that all false
statements wilfully and corruptly made by a witPerjury
ness as to matters which affect his credit are material, and he is liable to be convicted of perjury in respect
thereof; and that therefore a defendant, charged with selling
beer without a license, who falsely swears that, when previously charged with a similar offence, he had not authorized
a plea of guilty to be put in, and that such a plea had been
put in without his knowledge and against his will, is guilty of
perjury, since such statements were material, as affecting thedefendant's credit as a witness.
According to a recent decision of the House of Lords,
when a principal entrusts an agent with securities, and instructs
him to raise a certain sum upon them, but the
Principal
and Agent,
agent borrows a larger sum upon them and fraudulently appropriates

Liability of

cannot redeem the securities without paying the

Principal

the differenee,

the principal

Nxuceso

lender all he has lent, if the latter acted bona fide

and in ignorance of the limitation, although the agent obtained
the loan by fraud and forgery, and the lender did not know
that the agent had authority to borrow at all, and made no
inquiry: Brocklesby v. Temperance Permanent Bldg . Soc.,
[1895] A. C. 173 ; affirming [1893] 3 Ch. 130.

A contract to act as county printer for the year, made with
the county commissioners, at their regular meeting in January,
is valid, in spite of the fact that a majority of the
Public
Contract,
Validity

board, as it then existed, was to go out of office

the week after: Liggett v. Board of Corers. of

Kiowa Co., (Court of Appeals of Colorado,) 40 Pac. Rep. 475..

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

Unless there is some special statutory requirement, a city
council or other contracting body cannot arbitrarily refuse to
entertain a bid for public printing, because the
Rejection
of Bid
bidder is not at that time the owner of a newspaper: Beriy v. City of Tacoma, (Supreme Court of 'Washington,) 40 Pac. Rep. 414.
School laws are not rendered special or local, or otherwise
unconstitutional, by the fact that under their 6peration a higher
grade of education may be afforded to the
School Laws,
Constitutionality children in one district than that provided for
those in another: Landis v. Ashkworth, (Supreme Court of
New Jersey,) 31 Atl. Rep. 1017.

In the opinion of the same court, the power to purchase
land and erect a school-house includes also the power to
Erection of fence and grade the lot, to supply the school
School-house property with drinking water, and to eqiuip the
school-house with proper school furniture: State v. Board of
Education of Cranbzin,, 31 Atl. Rep. 1033.

When by statute, a sheriff is allowed his actual traveling
expenses, in addition to his fees, the county is liable for railroad
fare which he has paid, since they are part of the
Sheriff,
Traveling
actual expenses necessarily incurred, even though
Expenses
he has a railroad pass, which he does not use:
SaigTent v. Boardof Comrs. of La Plata Co., (Supreme Court
of Colorado,) 40 Pac. Rep. 366.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has recently decided,
over the strong dissent of AVERY and CLARK, JJ., that when
an enrolled bill has been duly signed by tht- PresiStatutes,
Passage,
dent of the Senate and Speaker of the House, a
Journals
court cannot go behind this record, and inquire
whether, in the passage of the bill, it was fraudulently enrolled
before it had been read before each house the number of times
required by the constitution, though that fact is apparent on
the face of the journal of proceedings kept by each house in
accordance with the requirements of the constitution: Carr
v. Coke, 22 S. E. Rep. 16. The real effect of this decision
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will be better understood from the fact that it appeared from
the journal that the only bill similar to the one signed by
the presiding officers had been introduced in the House of
Representatives, passed first reading, was tabled on second
reading, and was still to be found among the files of documents. No such bill had ever been introduced in the Senate.
It would be difficult to conceive of a more flagrant abuse of
legal principles.
MONTGOMERY,

J., in his concurring opinion, stated the bear-

ings of the question at issue very clearly, but unfortunately
erred in his solution of it. It, he said, brought to light "the
more than possibilities of two most serious menaces to popular government: The first one, that of the power of a corruptible or incompetent clerical force, or that of a depraved
and hired set of lobbyists, or both together, to tamper with the
acts and proceedings of the legislature, and have that certified
to be law which never was in fact enacted; the second, that
of the power of defeated and unscrupulous politicians, when
stung by loss of office or a desire for revenge on their political
enemies, to practically repeal the legislation of their successful opponents by resorts to the courts upon mere allegations
that there was fraud in the passage of the acts or in their ratification, and by procuring injunctions upon affidavits obtained
possibly through bribery, or through the ignorance or carelessness of the oath maker. By the decision of the court, the
latter danger-the far most to be dreaded-is avoided. The
presiding officers of the two houses may, by taking a sufficiency of time, and by close scrutiny and rigid examination of
the bills and wrappers, prevent fraud and error in ratification,
if such a thing be attempted; while for the latter danger no
limit or restraint can be found, except in the conscience of men
who have never cultivated a sense of either generosit, or
justice."
With all due deference, the latter contingency is not the
most to be dreaded. By a lawsuit, no matter how baseless or
vexatious, no matter how corruptly carried on, the truth
standsla chance of being brought to light; but according to
the ruling in this case, it can never be. The only remedy the
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people have against a statute foisted upon them as this was, is
to repeal it at the next session ; and meanwhile suffer all its
evil consequences. The repeal, too, might be prevented by the
very means that secured the passage of the bill in the first
place. The position of the learned judge is therefore utterly
fallacious; and it is a pleasure to be able to contrast with his
dogmatic inanities the vigorous language of the dissenting opinion of CLARK, J., which effectually disposes of the fancied inviolability of the certification of the bill by the presiding officers
of the legislature. "The signing," he says, "has no law-making power in itself, but is a mere certification of what the lawmaking body has decided, and, like all certificates, may be
impeached for fraud or mistake; otherwise the certificate is
more powerful than the authority doing the act which is certified. If we could conceive that the two presiding officers of
any legislature should purposely certify that a bill has passed
which had in fact been defeated, this could not nullify the
action of the two houses. If it could, then they, and not the
general assembly, are the law-making power. Certainly, for
a stronger reason, when the signatures of the presiding officers
are procured by a trick and fraud practiced on them, there
cannot be such virtue therein, as to make a law against the
vote of the body."
This, however, did not prevent the court from adhering to its
former decision when the question was raised before it a second
time; and in Wyatt v. Wheeler & Wilson Mfg. Co., (N. C.) 22
S. E. Rep. i 2o, it simply affirmed the decision in Carrv.Coke,
with the same difference of opinion as in that case.
The Supreme Court of Texas has recently held, overruling
the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals, in 31 S. W. Rep.
216, that since the contract of a minor to pay
Statute ef
Frauds,
the principal and interest of money loaned him to
Guarantee of

Minor's

Contracts

carry on business is not void, the promise of another to answer for such a debt is within the stat-

ute of frauds, and the president of a bank cannot be held
liable on a parol promise to become liable to the bank
for the overdrafts of a minor; but he is liable to the bank for
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any loss sustained by reason of loans to the minor which he
has verbally promised to see repaid, on the ground that he
has been guilty of a breach of trust: Brown v. Farmers' &
.17ferchants' Nail. Bank of Cleburne, 31 S. W. Rep. 285.
In House v. Houston Waterworks Co., 31 S. W. Rep. 179, the
Supreme Court of Texas, affirming the decision of the Court
of Civil Appeals, (22 S. W. Rep. 277,) has ruled:
Water
That a water company which has made a con(i)
Company,
Breach of
tract with a city to furnish water to extinguish fires,
Contract,
Liability for is not liable to the owners of private property deLoss by Fire stroyed by fire through its failure to furnish water
according to the contract; (2) That the breach of the contract to furnish water does not render the company liable in
tort for the destruction of private property by fire; and (3)
That when a water company contracts with a city to furnish
water to extinguish fires, it does not undertake a public duty
which will render it liable for the destruction of private property on breach of the contract by failure to furnish water.
The owner of property which has been destroyed by fire
cannot maintain an action to recover damages from a water
company, on the ground that the property was destroyed by
the failure of the water company to furnish a supply of water
as required by the terms of its contract with the town, since
there is no priority of contract between the parties to the action:
Nickerson v. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co., 46 Conn. 24; Fowlerv.
Athens City Waterworks Co., 83 Ga. 219; S. C., 9 S. E. Rep.
673; Fitchi v. Seymour Water Co., (Ind.) 37 N. E. Rep. 982;
Davis v. Clinton Waterworks Co., 54 Iowa, 59; S. C., 6 N. W.
Rep. 126; Eaton v. Fairbury Waterworks Co., 37 Neb. 546;
S. C., 56 N. W. Rep. 201; Wazinwright v. Queens Co. Waterworks Co., 28 N. Y. Suppl. 987; S. C., 78 Hun, (N. Y.) 146;
Beck v. Kittanning Water Co., (Pa.) i i Atl. Rep. 3oo; Foster v. Lookout Water Co., 3 Lea, (Tenn.) 42; Britton v. Green
Bay & Ft. Howard Waterworks Co., 81 Wis. 48 ; S. C., 51 N.
W. Rep. 84. Nor does the fact that the ordinance granting
the franchise requires the company to supply the city and its
inhabitants with sufficient water to put out fires, or to main-
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tain the water at a certain pressure, create the necessary priority
of contract: Fowler v. Atlens City Water-works CO., 83 Ga.
219 ; S. C., 9 S. E. Rep. 673 ; Eaton v. Fairbury Waterworks
CO., 37 Neb. 546; S. C., 56 N. IV. Rep. :2Ol; Britton v. Green
Bav & Ft. Hozvard Waterworks Co., 81 Wis. 48; S. C., 5'
N. XV. Rep. 84. Not even a statute, requiring the pipes to be
kept charged at a certain pressure, will give the right of action;
Atchison v. Newcastle & Gateshead' Wate;-works Co., 2 Exch.
Di.- 441, reversing 6 L. R. Exch. 404.
The owner cannot maintain an action, eVen though the city
has raised by taxation a special fund, to which the plaintiff
contributed, to pay for a sufficient supply of water for use in
case of fire: Becker v. Zfeokztk Watervoi.ks, 79 Iowa, 419;
S. C., 44 N. W. Rep. 694; or though the citizens pay a
special tax to the company, undei- its contract with the city I
Howzosmon v. Trenton Water Co., 119 Mo. 304; S. C., 24 S.W.
Rep. 784.
A municipality has no power to contract by ordinance or
otherwise with an individual or com.pany, to indemnify a citizen and taxpayer for damages which lie may sustain by reason
of a failure to furnish water as provided ii the contract, so as
to enable the citizen to maintain an action therefor in his own
name; nor is such power conferred by a statute authorizing
cities to contract for the building and operation of waterworks
by ifdividuals or companies: Vanhorn v. Cio of Des Joifues,
63 Iowa, 447; S. C., 19 N, W. Rep. 293; Becker v. Keokuk
Wateiworks, 79 Iowa, 419; S. C., 44 N. W. Rep. 694; A ol
.v. Cheryvale Water & Wf. CO., 48 Kans. 12; S. C., 28
Pac. Rep. 989; Pliamix Ins. Co. v. Trenton Water Co., 42 Mo,
App. 1 iS.
Further, a municipatlity has no such interest in the property
destroyed as to give it a right of action against the water
company, and therefore the owner of the property destroyed
cannot maintain an action against the company as assignee of
the right of action of the municipality: Ferris v, Carson Water
Co., I6 Nev. 44.
But, under the Civil Code of Kentucky, § 18, which requires
that every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real
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party in 'interest, it has been held that when the contract of a
water company with a city declares that it is made for the
benefit of the inhabitants, and, inter alia, for the protection of
private property against destruction by fire, the owner of property which is taxed for water-rent, and is destroyed by fire
through the failure of the company to supply a sufficient
quantity of water to extinguish the same, may, in his own
name, sue the company on its contract with the city: Paducali
Lumber Co. v. Pad'cal Water Supphv Co., 89 Ky. 340; S. C.,
12 S. W. Rep. 554; Duncan v. Owensboro Water Co., (Ky.)
12 S. W. Rep. 557.

The omission to furnish water to extinguish fires does not
authorize the owner of property destroyed thereby to maintain
an action of tort, since a mere breach, by omission only, of a
contract entered into with the public, is not a tort, either direct
or indirect, to the private property of an individual: Fowker v.
Athens City Waterworks CO., 83 Ga. 219; S. C., 9 S. E.
Rep. 673.

The House of Lords has recently elaborated the principles.
laid down in Saunders v. Vautier, 4 Beav. 115 ; S. C., Cr. &
Wills,
Legacy

Payable in
futuro,
Accumulations

P. 240, to the effect that (i) When in a will there

is an absolute vested gift made payable at a future
event with directions to accumulate the income in.
the meantime and pay it with the principal, the
courts will not enforce the trust for accumulation

in which no person has any interest but the legatee, i. e., that
a legatee may put an end to an accumulation which is exclusively for his benefit; (2) This rule is as applicable when the
legatee is a charity, corporate or unincorporate, as when he is an
individual; and (3) When such an accumulation is directed
for more than twenty-one years from the death of the testator,,
and is not effective, for the reason given above, the Thelluson.
Act, (39 & 40 Geo. 3, c. 98,) prohibiting indefinite trusts for
accumulation, does not apply: Wharton v. ikfasterman, [1895]
A. C. 186, affirming [ 1894] 2 Ch. 184.
When a testator devises and bequeathes his entire estate to,
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trustees, to collect the income therefrom, and divide the net
Trust,
income in specified proportions among his children
Const-uction for their respective lives, and, at the death of each
child, gives and devises a specified portion of the corpus of
the estate to the child or children of that deceased child, or,
and in event of there being none, then to others, the implied
intention is that, upon the death of each child, the estate which
the trustees formerly had in that portion of the corpus which
was given to the child or children of the deceased childi or to
others in case there should be no child, should cease and
determine, and that that portion of the corpus should vest in
the parties entitled thereto, free from the trust: Roarti' v.
Smitlh, (Court of Chancery of New jersey,) 31 AtL Rep. 103 1.

